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TRADE COMMISSION IMPROVEMENT ACT:
PROTECTING CONSUMERS THROUGH PRODUCT
WARRANTIES
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act,' effective July 4, 1975, is designed to expand the
consumer protection capabilities of the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC).2 The Act amends the Federal Trade Commission Act3 by al-
tering the jurisdictional4 and rule-making' powers of the FTC. The
Act also establishes requirements for written warranties6 thus repre-
senting a congressional effort to modify, for the consumer's benefit,
certain aspects of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.).1 However,
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(m), 46(a)-(b), (g)-(h), 49, 50, 52, 56, 57a, 57b, 57c, 58
[hereinafter referred to as the FTCIA], 2301-2312 [hereinafter referred to as the
Magnuson-Moss Act] (Supp. IV, 1974). The combination of the Magnuson-Moss Act
and the FTCIA will hereinafter be referred to as the Act.
I H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1974), reprinted at 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADM. NEWS 7702.
15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1970).
1 Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 201 (Jan. 4, 1975) amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 46(a)-(b),
and 52 (1970). This amendment replaces the words "in commerce" with "in or affect-
ing commerce." Congress sought to align the jurisdictional power of the FTC with that
of other federal agencies. H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1974), reprinted
at 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS 7712. The jurisdictional power of the FTC had
been restricted since 1941 by the Supreme Court's holding in FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312
U.S. 349 (1941). The court there held that a Congressional amendment was necessary
to expand the jurisdictional scope of the Act. Id. at 355.
'15 U.S.C. § 57a (Supp. IV, 1974). The Act authorizes the FTC to promulgate
rules regarding disclosure of warranty terms, id. § 2302(a), see text accompanying
notes 56-63 infra; pre-sale availability of warranty terms, id. § 2302(b)(1)(A), see text
accompanying notes 118-121 infra; and informal dispute settlement mechanisms, id.
§ 2310(a)(2), see text accompanying notes 98-108 infra.
I The Magnuson-Moss Act additionally creates remedies for breach of warranty.
See text accompanying notes 64-117 infra.
I Congress recognized a pressing need for change in the law regulating warranties
because the U.C.C., which comprises the law of sales, was ineffective in the area of
consumer protection. Congress noted that under the U.C.C. "'the bold print giveth
and the fine print taketh away.'" H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1974),
reprinted at 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEws 7706. See text accompanying notes
49-55 infra.
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these amendments are not the first attempt by Congress to make the
FTC an agency for consumer protection.
In 1914 Congress established the FTC to supplement existing fed-
eral antitrust legislation.' Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act 9 declared that unfair methods of competition were unlawful. The
Supreme Court strictly construed this language,' 0 holding that con-
sumers were not protected in the absence of an injury to competi-
tion." In 1938 Congress amended § 5 of the Act 2 to alleviate this
problem by adding the words "unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in commerce."' 3 However, this extension of the FTC's powers did not
effect a significant increase in its ability to protect consumers,'4 be-
cause the FTC has failed to identify the most important consumer
problems." Consequently, Congress has acted "to provide the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) with means of better protecting
consumers .. ."I6 The Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act is an attempt to make the FTC "di-
rectly responsive to the needs of the American consumer."'" Congress
See generally, G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: A STUDY IN AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE (1924); Thompson, Highlights in the Evolution of the
Federal Trade Commission, 8 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 257 (1939).
1 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
0 FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 543 (1931).
" As one commentator noted, "[The interest of the public was subordinated to
that of competitors, since the Commission could not act where a monopoly existed or
where all competitors were using the same practices." Note, Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act-Amendments Under the Wheeler-Lea Act, 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 121, 122
(1938).
12 Act of Mar. 21, 1938, Pub. L. No. 447 § 3, 52 Stat. 111, amending 15 U.S.C. §
45 (1934).
13 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1938). For a discussion of the Congressional purposes for the
amendment see, Note, The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1938, 39 COLUM. L. REV.
259 (1939).
" See generally, REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION (1969); E. Cox, R. FELLMETH & J. SCHULZ, THE 'NADER REPORT' ON THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969).
11 REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 37
(1969). It has been further suggested that "cronyism" played a significant role in the
FTC's failure to function as an effective consumer protection agency because it pro-
vided the agency with incompetent employees on decision-making levels. See E. Cox,
R. FELLMETH & J. SCHULZ, THE 'NADER REPORT' ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 170
(1969).
11 H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1974), reprinted at 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADM. NEWS 7702.
"1 120 CONG. REC. S21978 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (remarks of Senator Magnu-
son).
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expects that the FTC will effectively implement the powers which it
has been granted by the Act."
However, whether the FTC will fully implement the expansive
consumer protection provisions of the Act is not clear. There are
already conflicts between the Magnuson-Moss Act and the FTC rules
proposed pursuant to § 102 of the Act.'" For example, under the Act,
''consumers" are buyers of consumer products and persons to whom
the product is transferred."0 Yet the FTC has proposed a rule which
requires disclosure of any limitation on the enforceability of the war-
ranty "by any person other than the first purchaser at retail." 21 Seem-
ingly, the FTC does not consider the category of transferees very
extensive. Under the proposed rule a warrantor would not be liable
to any person who bought the consumer good from the initial pur-
chaser, if the warrantor conspicuously disclosed the limitation at the
initial sale of the product. This is contrary to the Congressional intent
to include in the definition of consumer "any person to whom such
[consumer] product is transferred during the duration of the
warranty .. ."22
A second conflict between Congressional purpose and FTC imple-
mentation arises from the FTC's apparent recognition of a condition
precedent to warranty coverage21 which would be contrary to §
104(b)(1) of the Act.24 The Act specifically allows two conditions pre-
cedent to warranty coverage.? Consumers may be required to give
notice of the defect to the warrantor,26 and they may be required to
deliver the product to the warrantor free and clear of liens.? The
, Senator Magnuson stated that:
No longer will the Federal Trade Commission be confined to slapping
the wrists of persons who engage in unfair or deceptive practices and
telling them not to do it again. The bill authorizes the Federal Trade
Commission to not only bring a halt to unfair or deceptive acts or
practices but also to go into court and ask a judge to order consumer
redress for those people who have been injured by such acts or prac-
tices.
Id. at S21977.
, 15 U.S.C. § 2302 (Supp. IV, 1974).
Id. § 2301(3).
2, 40 Fed. Reg. 29893, proposed as Rule 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(b) (1975).
22 H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1974), reprinted at 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADM. NEWS 7717.
2 40 FED. REG. 29893, proposed as Rule 16 C.F.R. § 7 01.3(g) (1975).
24 15 U.S.C. § 2304(b)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
.Additional conditions may be allowed if the warrantor can demonstrate to the
FTC that they are necessary. Id.
26 Id.
21 This requirement may not be imposed on the consumer if the FTC determines
1976]
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FTC's proposed rules, however, allow a third condition precedent to
warranty coverage. Consumers may be required to return warranty
registration cards in order to be covered by the warranty.Y Until the
rules become final and the FTC begins to enforce them, the FTC's
efforts to comply with Congressional intent cannot be evaluated.
Generally, the confusion engendered by the Act and the FTC's pro-
posed rules can be clarified only by judicial interpretation of such
terms as "consumer, '2 9 "transferee, '3 and "warrantor." '3' Clarifica-
tion of these terms is essential to the successful operation of the
consumer protection devices established by Congress.
The major Congressional devices for protecting consumers are the
designation of the kind of warranty,32 a prohibition of the disclaimer
of implied warranties when a written warranty is given,3 and the
disclosure of information on the face of the warranty. 4 The disclosure
and designation requirements established by the Magnuson-Moss
Act are conditioned on the retail cost of the product.
3 5
The Act requires written warranties36 to be designated as either
that it would be impracticable. Id. § 2304(b)(2).
40 Fed. Reg. 29893, proposed as Rule 16 C.F.R. § 701.4 (1975). The effect which
these cards may have on a consumer class action taken under 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)
(Supp. WVt 1974) is discussed in the text accompanying notes 84-101 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
30 Id.
3' A "warrantor" includes "any supplier or other person who gives or offers to give
a written warranty or who is or may be obligated under an implied warranty." 15
U.S.C. § 2301(5) (Supp. IV, 1974). A "supplier" is any person "engaged in the business
of making a consumer product directly or indirectly available to consumers." Id. §
2301(4). The effect of the interaction of these definitions may be to hold manufacturers
liable for defects which arise solely because of improper installation of the product.
Hearings on H.R. 20 and H.R. 5021 Before the Sub-Comm. on Commerce and Finance
of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser.
17, 166-178 (1973) (Remarks of Mr. Thomas Nichol, Jr., General Counsel, Gas Applic-
ance Mfrs. Ass'n.).
- 15 U.S.C. § 2303 (Supp. IV, 1974). See text accompanying notes 36-48 infra.
15 U.S.C. § 2308 (Supp. IV, 1974). See text accompanying notes 49-55 infra.
u 15 U.S.C. § 2302 (Supp. IV, 1974). See text accompanying notes 56-63 infra.
I Section 102(e) of the Act states that the disclosure requirements set forth in that
section apply "only to warranties which pertain to consumer products actually costing
the consumer more than $5." Id. § 2302(e). Section 103(d) of the Act states that the
designation requirements for warranties automatically govern consumer goods actually
costing more than $10. Id. § 2303(d).
The Magnuson-Moss Act defines a written warranty as:
(A) any written affirmation of fact or written promise made in connec-
tion with the sale of consumer products by a supplier to a buyer which
relates to the nature of the material or workmanship and affirms or
promises that such material or workmanship is defect free or will meet
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"full" or "limited" when consumer goods actually cost"1 more than
$10. "Full" warranties are those which meet or exceed minimum
requirements set forth in § 104(a) of the Magnuson-Moss Act.8 A full
warranty requires the warrantor to remedy defects in consumer prod-
ucts "within a reasonable time and without charge."3 The warrantor
must also allow the consumer to elect either a refund or a replace-
ment of the defective product if it is not successfully repaired after a
reasonable number of attempts."0 Moreover, the consumer will not be
required to pay for the replacement of the product or any part
thereof.4 These requirements make full warranties more responsive
to consumer transactions by imposing the responsibility for a defec-
tive product on the warrantor.
The minimum standards for a full warranty also include a pro-
hibition against the limitation of the duration of any implied war-
ranties. This assures warranty protection for consumers until the
statute of limitations bars an action by the consumer against the
warrantor. 2 In addition, full warranties may not limit consequential
a specified level of performance over a specified period of time, or
(B) any undertaking in writing in connection with the sale by a sup-
plier of a consumer product to refund, repair, replace, or take other
remedial action with respect to such product in the event that such
product fails to meet the specifications set forth in the undertaking,
which written affirmation, promise, or undertaking becomes part of
the basis of the bargain between a supplier and a buyer for purposes
other than resale of such product.
Id. § 2301(6). Subsection (A) is similar to the provision for written warranties in U.C.C.
§ 2-313(1)(a). Subsection (B) of the Magnuson-Moss Act, unlike U.C..C. § 2-313,
emphasizes the relationship between the consumer and the warrantor more than does
the U.C.C. However, the requirement that the "affirmation, promise, or undertaking
becomes a basis of the bargain" is the same in the Magnuson-Moss Act and in U.C.C.
§ 2-313.
3 "Actual cost" is not intended to include any imposts such as sales taxes. H.R.
REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1974), reprinted at 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADM. NEWS 7718.
15 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (Supp. IV, 1974).
Id. § 2304(a)(1).
The FTC is authorized to specify by rule "what constitutes a reasonable number
of attempts to remedy particular kinds of defects or malfunctions under different
circumstances." Id. § 2304(a)(4).
' Id.
4 Id. § 2304(a)(2). Implied warranties are those which arise under state law. Id.
§ 2301(7). These are: (1) the implied warranty of merchantability, U.C.C. § 2-314, and
(2) the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, U.C.C. § 2-315. The
duration of these warranties is generally set by the contract statute of limitations
because the injury suffered by the consumer is of a commercial nature. 3 L. FRUMER &
M. FRIEDmAN, PRODucrS LmnLrrY § 40.01[1] (1975). U.C.C. § 2-725(1) states that "an
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damages for breach of warranty unless the limitation is conspicuously
disclosed on the warranty. 3 Any warranty designated as full is con-
sidered to include these minimum standards.4 By specifying the min-
imum requirements of a full warranty Congress has made full, written
warranties uniform and understandable for consumers.45
Written warranties which do not meet the minimum standards for
full warranties must be designated as "limited."4 Under a limited
warranty, the duration of an implied warranty47 may be limited to
that of the express warranty if the limitation is conscionable. 8 Thus,
while a full warranty does not allow any limitation on the duration
of an implied warranty, a limited warranty does.
Under the Magnuson-Moss Act, when a written warranty is given,
implied warranties may not be disclaimed, regardless of the warranty
designation.49 This prohibition essentially negates U.C.C. § 2-316, the
section which permits the disclaimer of implied warranties," as it
applies to written warranties.5 ' U.C.C. § 2-316 was drafted "to protect
a buyer from unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer
... .,,' However, it does not always attain that end.53 To the ex-
tent that U.C.C. § 2-316 and the Magnuson-Moss Act overlap, the
prohibition against the disclaimer of implied warranties will solve
the problem of consumers purchasing goods with an implied warranty
disclaimer clause attached. A warrantor who provides a consumer
action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after
the cause of action accrued."
15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974). U.C.C. § 2-719(3) provides for the
limitation of consequential damages.
15 U.S.C. § 2304(e) (Supp. IV, 1974).
" Id. § 2302. See text accompanying notes 56-63 infra.
18 Id. § 2303(a)(2).
17 See note 42 supra.
' 15 U.S.C. § 2308(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
4' Id. § 2308(a).
0 The U.C.C. states that "all implied warranties are excluded by expressions like
'as is,' 'with all faults' or other language which in common understanding calls the
buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no
implied warranty." U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a).
5, Section 2-316 provides for the disclaimer of implied warranties without regard
to the type of warranty given on the product. Express warranties created orally, written
warranties, and implied warranties may all be disclaimed. U.C.C. § 2-316.
52 Id. Comment (1).
See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Wilson Plumbing Co., 132 Ga. App. 435, 208 S.E.2d
321 (1974); Turner v. International Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. 277, 336 N.E.2d 62
(1975). See also, West, Disclaimer of Warranties-Its Curse and (Possible) Cure, 76
CoM. L.J. 253 (1971); Note, Disclaimer of Warranty in Consumer Sales, 77 HARV. L.
REv. 318 (1963).
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with a written warranty on a consumer product can no longer dis-
claim the implied warranties which result from the sale. However, the
Magnuson-Moss Act applies only when the warranty given is writ-
ten. 4 If no warranty is given or if it is given orally," U.C.C. § 2-316
remains in effect and implied warranties may be disclaimed. Thus
the Magnuson-Moss Act disclaimer provision can be circumvented to
the ultimate damage of the consumer. Sellers of consumer goods may
refuse to warrant their products with written instruments and, conse-
quently, may avail themselves of the disclaimer provision in the
U.C.C. The result may be the sale of consumer goods without any
warranties at all.
An additional device for consumer protection is the requirement
that warrantors disclose certain information on the face of the war-
ranty." For example, consumers will be made aware of the existence
of certain manufacturer's settlement devices57 through the disclosure
on the warranty.5 Section 102 of the Act59 authorizes the FTC to
promulgate rules for disclosure of the terms of warranties "to improve
the adequacy of information available to consumers, prevent decep-
tion, and improve competition in the marketing of consumer prod-
ucts."6 The FTC rules proposed under this section seek "to ensure
that consumers obtain warranty performance on their own behalf."1
The consumer will be able to identify the warrantor" and ascertain
the procedure he must follow to procure performance of warranty
obligations. 3 These proposed disclosure requirements provide con-
sumers with all the information necessary to initiate their claims
against warrantors.
Once these claims are instituted, various remedies are available
to the consumer and the FTC. 4 In analyzing the remedies established
15 U.S.C. § 2308(a) (Supp. IV, 1974).
" U.C.C. § 2-313 does not require a writing for the creation of an express warranty.
See, e.g., Boehm v. Fox, 473 F.2d 445 (10th Cir. 1973); Capital Equip. Enterprises, Inc.
v. North Pier Terminal Co., 177 Ill. App. 2d 264, 254 N.E.2d 542 (1969).
58 The general information to be disclosed includes the name and address of the
warrantor, the time when the warrenty commences, and the part or parts of the prod-
uct covered or excluded from coverage under the warranty. 40 Fed. Reg. 29893, pro-
posed as Rule 16 C.F.R. § 701.3 (1975).
5 See text accompanying notes 101-112 infra.
51 40 Fed. Reg. 29893, proposed as Rule 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(i) (1975).
' 15 U.S.C. § 2302 (Supp. IV, 1974).
Id. § 2302(a).
40 Fed. Reg. 29892 (1974).
62 See note 58 supra.
40 Fed. Reg. 29893, proposed as Rule 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(h) (1975).
" See text accompanying notes 80-130 infra.
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by the Act, the courts might be guided by the contrast between the
U.C.C. and the Magnuson-Moss Act. While there are some similari-
ties,6" variations in the statutory definitions illuminate a different
emphasis in the Magnuson-Moss Act and in the U.C.C. Illustrative
of this is the use of merchant-non-merchant terminology in the
U.C.C., and consumer-warrantor terminology in the Magnuson-
Moss Act. When particular knowledge or skills are required, the
U.C.C. imposes on merchants standards which are different from
those which govern non-merchants."8 In other situations, no distinc-
tion is made between merchants and non-merchants. 7 For example,
under the U.C.C. the duty of seasonably notifying the seller of rejec-
tion of goods rests equally on merchant and non-merchant buyers."
However, merchant-buyers of large quantities of goods are better able
to provide measures for inspection of newly delivered goods than are
occasional buyers of goods for personal consumption. 9 Thus the
U.C.C. regulates and emphasizes commercial transactions. 70
Conversely, the Act protects consumers from unfair or deceptive
acts or practices.7 The Act extends its protection only to consumers"
65 See, e.g., the comparison of the definition of written and express warranties in
note 36 supra.
66 U.C.C. § 2-104, Comment (2) sets forth three situations where the requirements
of the U.C.C. apply only to merchants. The first situation is the formation of a contract
where the Statute of Frauds, id. § 2-201(2), firm offers, id. § 2-205, and modification
of the contract, id. § 2-209(2), are more flexible for merchants than non-merchants.
The rationale is that the activities subject to these sections are "typical of and familiar
to any person in business." Id. § 2-104, Comment (2). Second, only a person who
regularly deals with a certain type of goods is able to provide a warranty of mercanta-
bility. Id. § 2-314(1). The assumption is that through dealing with a certain type of
goods, the merchant becomes aware of possible defects and can insure against the sale
of these defective products more easily than the seller who is unfamiliar with such
merchandise. Finally, merchants are subject to a more rigorous standard of good faith
than are non-merchants. Compare id. § 2-103(b) with id. § 1-201(19).
67 See, e.g., id. § 2-711. Merchants and non-merchants are afforded the same
remedies for breach of contract. Merchants and non-merchants are also treated equally
by U.C.C. § 2-316, regarding the disclaimer of implied warranties, even though the
bargaining positions of the two parties are not comparable. See cases cited note 57
supra.
U.C.C. § 2-609(1). See text accompanying notes 75-76 infra.
69 Cf. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (Tray-
nor, J., concurring).
70 U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a) states that one of the underlying purposes of the U.C.C. is
"to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions."
7' 15 U.S.C. §§ 45 and 2302 (Supp. IV, 1974).
72 The Magnuson-Moss Act defines consumers as:
a buyer (other than for purposes of resale) of any consumer product,
any person to whom such product is transferred during the duration
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when purchasing consumer goods." Therefore unlike the U.C.C., the
Magnuson-Moss Act does not affect sales between merchants. Fur-
thermore, the remedies made available by the Act operate mainly to
protect consumers in their dealings with warrantors 4
The Magnuson-Moss Act permits consumers to bring an action
against a warrantor who injures them by failing to comply with the
provisions of Title I of the Act. 5 This is a striking contrast to the
U.C.C. Under U.C.C. § 2-602(1), a buyer may reject those goods
which do not meet the warranty standards, but this is not a reasona-
ble alternative for consumers because the buyer must notify the seller
of his rejection of the goods within a reasonable time.76 Consumers
often do not become aware of the defect in the product until a lengthy
period of time after the purchase of the goods. The consumer then
fails to give seasonable notice, which results in acceptance 7 of the
of an implied or written warranty. . . applicable to the product, and
any other person who is entitled. . . to enforce against the warrantor
. . . the obligations of the warranty.
Id. § 2301(3). The protection afforded by the Act is triggered by the sale of consumer
goods to a consumer. The U.C.C. does not gdnerally distinguish between merchants
and non-merchants in particular types of commercial transactions. See note 68 supra.
3 The Magnuson-Moss Act defines consumer products as:
• . . any tangible personal property which is distributed in commerce
and which is . . . normally used for personal, family, or household
purposes (including any such property intended to be attached to or
installed in any real property without regard to whether it is so at-
tached or installed).
Id. § 2301(1).
In contrast, the U.C.C. defines consumer goods as those which are "used or bought
for use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes." U.C.C. § 9-109(1). The
U.C.C. considers its four categories of goods-consumer, equipment, farm products,
and inventory-as mutually exclusive. Thus, "a radio is inventory in the hands of a
dealer and consumer goods in the hands of a householder." Id. § 9-109, Comment (2).
The NATIONAL CONsuMER Acr, First Final Draft (1970) § 1.301(8), proposed by Profes-
sional Staff, National Consumer Law Center, Boston College Law School, does not
make any such distinction.
71 Merchants may also be awarded relief pursuant to § 206 of the Act. 15 U.S.C.
§ 57b(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
11 Id. § 2310(d).
78 U.C.C. § 2-602(1).
7 Acceptance is defined in U.C.C. § 2-606. Acceptance occurs when the buyer,
"after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods signifies to the seller that the
goods are conforming or that he will take or retain them in spite of their non-
conformity." U.C.C. § 2-606(1)(a). Acceptance may also occur within a reasonable
time after an ineffective rejection or if the buyer does any act inconsistent with the
seller's ownership. In the context of a consumer sales transaction, acceptance is likely
to occur simply because the consumer is satisfied with the product at the time he
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goods. Other remedies are provided by the U.C.C., however they too
are generally inadequate for consumers.78
The Magnuson-Moss Act retains and supplements these reme-
dies.79 Section 110(d) of the Act 0 provides for consumer suits, which
may be brought as a class action in federal district court, against
warrantors who have not complied with the provisions of the Act.
Under the U.C.C., buyers who wish to bring a class action against a
seller may do so in state courts' or, if diversity of citizenship exists,
purchases it and puts the product to its intended use. The consumer does not notify
the seller of any non-conformity of the goods to the contract (including the warranty)
within a reasonable time, thereby failing to properly reject the goods. Acceptance of
the goods occurs by operation of law after the buyer has then had a "reasonable
opportunity to inspect them." U.C.C. § 2-606(1)(b).
11 The buyer may revoke his acceptance and proceed against the seller as if he had
rejected the goods. Section 2-608 states that:
The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit
whose non-conformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has
accepted it ...
(b) without discovery of such non-conformity if his acceptance was
reasonably induced either by the difficulty of discovery before accept-
ance or by the seller's assurances.
U.C.C. § 2-608(1)(b). The buyer may cancel the sales contract and recover any money
he has already paid. In addition to recovering so much as has been paid to the seller,
the buyer may "cover" and seek damages as determined under U.C.C. § 2-712. How-
ever, this remedy is not generally feasible for consumers. Unlike the resale of non-
conforming "widgets," the resale of a single broken toaster is a difficult task. Conse-
quently, the "cover" remedy provided by the U.C.C. is not an effective tool for consum-
ers.
This does not, however, preclude the buyer from recovering. More likely, the buyer
will justifiably revoke his acceptance and recover any loss resulting in the ordinary
course of events from the seller's breach. U.C.C. § 2-714(1). Under U.C.C. § 2-714(2),
damages are the difference between the value of the goods as accepted and the value
of the goods as conforming to the warranty. This formula would not allow recovery
under circumstances common to consumer sales. If the product is not defective at the
time of acceptance, it conforms to the warranty. The two values are the same, and
therefore there are no damages. When the consumer purchases the product it is usually
in perfect working order and only after a product is used for a time does it become
defective. A measure of damages which is more appropriate to consumer transactions
is the value of conforming goods minus the value of the defective goods. Whatever
formula the courts use in arriving at a proper amount of damages, the position of the
buyer and the nature of the loss should be of primary importance. Additionally, the
buyer may recover consequential and/or incidental expenses when appropriate. See
U.C.C. § 2-715.
71 15 U.S.C. § 2311(b)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
90 Id. § 2310(d).
R1 See, Note, Consumer Class Actions With a Multi-State Class: A Problem of
Jurisdiction, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1411, 1423-24 (1974).
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in federal courts.8" A class action in federal court, based on diversity,
cannot proceed unless every member of the class has a claim in excess
of $10,000.1 Individual consumer claims are usually closer to $25 than
they are to $10,000.4 Thus if the only option open to a class of con-
sumers is a suit based on diversity of citizenship, no action can be
brought at all. However, Congress has limited this jurisdictional ob-
stacle through the Magnuson-Moss Act. Since the Act regulates com-
merce, subject matter jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 133785
which gives the federal district courts original jurisdiction of actions
brought under an Act of Congress regulating commerce. Under the
Magnuson-Moss Act the total amount in controversy must be $50,000
or more and there must be at least 100 named plaintiffs" for the
action to proceed as a class action. Individual claims of $25 or more
may be aggregated to meet the $50,000 requirement. 7
Despite the congressional assistance provided to consumers by §
110(d) of the Act," consumer class actions may be frustrated by the
recent Supreme Court holding in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline9
which construed the notice requirement of Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, ° emphasizing the importance of individual
notice. The Court declared that "notice and an opportunity to be
heard were fundamental requisites of the constitutional guarantee of
procedural due process." 2 If the members of the class are unascer-
tainable through reasonable efforts, individual notice will not be re-
quired." This ascertainment may produce a serious financial burden
e 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970).
13 See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973). In Zahn the court held
that any plaintiff whose claim does not satisfy the jurisdictional amount required must
be dismissed from the action. Id. at 301. For a discussion of alternatives to the type of
class action instituted by the plaintiffs in Zahn, see Kirkpatrick, Consumer Class
Litigation, 50 ORE. L. REv. 21 (1970).
I Bangs, Revised Rule 23: Aggregation of Claims for Achievement of Jurisdic-
tional Amount, 10 B. C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 601 (1969); Ford, Federal Rule 23: A
Device forAiding the Small Claimant, 10 B. C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 501 (1969); Kalven
& Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REv. 684
(1941).
- 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970).
n 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974).
nId.
Id. § 2310(d).
417 U.S. 156 (1974).
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
" 417 U.S. at 173-77.
12 Id. at 174.
,1 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
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for plaintiffs with limited resources. Nevertheless, in the legislative
history of the Act, Congress suggested that the courts carefully evalu-
ate the plaintiff's financial position when deciding the proper notice
to be given to the class. 4 However, under the FTC's proposed rules,
warrantors may require consumers to return warranty registration
cards as a condition to warranty coverage. This will provide the
warrantor with a ready list of those persons who are covered by the
warranty. This list could be obtained by the named plaintiffs in a
class action at a minimal cost. Actual notice to each member of the
class would, therefore, apparently be required.
A prerequisite to the maintenance of any action under § 110(d)
of the Act96 is that the consumer, or class of consumers, must initially
submit the dispute to an informal settlement mechanism if the war-
rantor has established one.97 Although Congressional policy is to en-
courage warrantors to establish such mechanisms," they need not do
so. The purpose of the mechanisms, which are free to consumers,"9 is
to settle complaints fairly and expeditiously.'10 The FTC has pro-
posed rules setting forth minimum requirements for the mecha-
nisms. °0 The decision of the mechanism is not legally binding,'02 but
the warrantor must act in good faith in determining whether to abide
by the result.'13 There is no comparable provision for consumers. To
ensure that the mechanisms attain their goal of fair and expeditious
dispute settlement, the FTC proposed a rule that the consumer would
11 H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1974), reprinted at 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADM. NEWS 7724.
40 Fed. Reg. 29893, proposed as Rule 16 C.F.R. § 701.4 (1975).
15 U.S.C. § 2310(d) (Supp. IV, 1974).
" Subsection (a)(3) of § 110 of the Act states that warrantors may establish
informal dispute settlement mechanisms. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974).
Id. § 2310(a)(1).
40 Fed. Reg. 29897, proposed as Rule 16 C.F.R. § 703.3(a) (1975).
'0 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
"1 40 Fed. Reg. 29896-99, proposed as Rules 16 C.F.R. §§ 703.1-703.8 (1975).
If there are less than three persons deciding a dispute, they shall have no direct
involvement in the manufacture, distribution, sale or service of any product. If three
or more members of a mechanism are deciding a dispute, two-thirds may not have any
direct involvement. 40 Fed. Reg. 29897, proposed as Rule 16 C.F.R. § 703.4(b) (1975).
"'Direct involvement' shall not include acquiring or owning an interest solely for
investment, and the acquisition or ownership of an interest which is offered to the
general public shall be prima facie evidence of its acquisition or ownership solely for
investment." Id.
102 Id. § 703.50). The decision of the mechanism is admissible in evidence in a
subsequent judicial action on the same claim. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974).
"1 40 Fed. Reg. 29897, proposed as Rule 16 C.F.R. § 703.2(g) (1975).
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not be required to submit to the mechanism process if a decision was
not made within 40 days after the date the consumer first notified the
mechanism of his complaint.' 4 The settlement procedure is also sub-
ject to scrutiny for fairness by the FTC either on its own initiative or
after a written complaint by any person.' 5 The good faith require-
ment imposed upon warrantors, the proposed time limit for the com-
pletion of claim settlement, and the FTC power to investigate the
mechanisms for fairness represent an excellent attempt to provide
consumers with a fast, simple procedure for settling claims. However,
the lack of a requirement that consumers abide in good faith by
unfavorable mechanism decisions may present a problem. If consum-
ers refuse to follow unfavorable mechanism decisions, a potentially
helpful consumer protection device will be lost because warrantors
may discontinue ineffective mechanisms."'
In addition to consumer class actions and private settlement, the
FTC may act on behalf of consumers who have been injured by war-
rantors.'17 Section 206 of the FTCIA"'" authorizes the FTC to com-
mence a civil action against anyone violating a rule regarding unfair
or deceptive practices under the Act.' 9 When an action is brought by
the FTC under this section, the court must give notice to those per-
sons allegedly injured by the defendant's actions. Those persons
wishing to be represented by the FTC in the action must notify the
court and they will be allowed to share in the relief awarded."" If a
person agrees to FTC representation, any subsequent action by the
consumer against the defendant in the FTC action on the same claim
would be barred."' However, if the consumer is not represented by
the FTC, he may bring an individual suit."' Therefore, unlike a con-
' Id. § 703.5(e).
10 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(4) (Supp. IV, 1974).
'1 If consumers do not abide by unfavorable mechanism decisions, complaints will
not be settled fairly and expeditiously and the primary purpose of the mechanism will
consequently be thwarted. Therefore, there would be no reason for warrantors to con-
tinue funding the mechanisms.
'1 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b) (Supp. IV, 1974). The FTC may bring an action on behalf
of all injured parties, not just consumers. Thus, competitors of the defendant could
also be represented by the FTC.
'n Id. § 57b.
'' Id. § 57b(a)(1). This power does not apply to violations of interpretive rules set
out by the FTC or to rules which the FTC has said do not constitute unfair or deceptive
acts or practices.
"O Cf. S. CONF. REP. No. 1408, to accompany S. 356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1974),
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sumer class action, the notice requirement for FTC actions may be
by publication' 3 and will not violate any due process requirements.
The FTC may institute the same type of suit after issuing a final
cease and desist order against any person whose conduct is of such a
nature that "a reasonable man would have known [the acts were]
dishonest or fraudulent.""' In both of these situations, the court may
grant whatever relief is necessary to remedy the injury caused by the
deceptive acts."' If this method of securing consumer redress is fully
utilized, it will provide a substantial step forward in consumer pro-
tection. The FTC's capacity to protect consumers has been enhanced
significantly by this affirmative function in addition to its regulatory
powers.
The FTC's regulatory power includes the agency's ability to seek
a preliminary restraining order against warrantors who make decep-
tive warranties' 6 or otherwise fail to comply with the Magnuson-
Moss Act."7 Previously, the FTC was authorized to seek preliminary
injunctions against false advertising only." ' Warranties must be
made available to the consumer before the sale,"' and hence they act
'" 15 U.S.C. § 57b(c)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974). See text accompanying notes 92-100
supra.
"I Id. § 57b(a)(2).
'is Id. § 57b(b). Although this subsection seemingly provides the courts with wide
discretion in the determination of relief, "nothing in this subsection is intended to
authorize the imposition of any exemplary or punitive damages." Id. Initially, it ap-
pears that punitive damages are proper when the defendant has engaged in acts or
practices that a reasonable man would consider dishonest or fraudulent. Since the FTC
has not promulgated a rule regarding the practice the businessman has engaged in,
Congress apparently does not intend to punish him unduly. The presence of a rule
alleviates uncertainty as to what the FTC considers to be unfair or deceptive. There-
fore, extensive relief for practices which are not subject to an FTC rule is reasonable
only when the practices are dishonest or fraudulent.
,,8 A deceptive warranty is:
(A) a written warranty which (i) contains an affirmation, promise,
description, or representation which is either false or fraudulent, or
which, in light of all of the circumstances, would mislead a reasonable
individual exercising due care; or (ii) fails to contain information
which is necessary in light of all of the circumstances, to make the
warranty not misleading to a reasonable individual exercising due
care; or (B) a written warranty created by use of such terms as "guar-
anty" or "warranty," if the terms and conditions of such warranty so
limit its scope and application to deceive a reasonable individual.
Id. § 2310(c)(2).
"I Id. § 2310(c)(1).
See Note, "Corrective Advertising" Orders of the Federal Trade Commission,
85 HAav. L. Rev. 477, 486 (1971).
"I The availability to consumers of warranty instruments prior to sale performs
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as advertisements for the product. Thus the similarities between false
advertising and deceptive warranties sustain the extension of the
false advertising control power.
In addition to these powers, the FTC may bring an action in
federal district court to recover a civil penalty against violators of the
Act.'1 The violator must have actual or constructive knowledge that
his activity is unfair and prohibited by a rule. 2' Civil penalties may
also be assessed against anyone who violates a final cease and desist
order' 2 with knowledge that the unfair or deceptive act is unlawful.'2
Each violation subjects the defendant to civil penalties of up to
$10,000.124 However the new procedure regarding violations of final
cease and desist orders is the same as that previously followed by the
FTC. A complaint is issued by the FTC to the respondent and a
hearing takes place before an examiner. His decision is subject to
review by the FTC. If a violation is found, a cease and desist order is
issued. The order becomes final 60 days after its issuance or 60 days
after its affirmance on appeal to a United States Court of Appeals.
If the final order is violated, civil penalties may be assessed.2 The
result of this three-step process is delay, and FTC attempts to accel-
erate enforcement or to increase protection by means of informal,
voluntary methods of compliance have failed. 26 Therefore, the addi-
an advertising function in that consumers may base their choice of purchase on a
comparison of warranties, just as a comparison of the advertisement of products may
also form the basis of purchase decisions.
1" 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A) (Supp. IV, 1974).
121 Id.
' Id. § 45(m)(1)(B).
' Id. § 45(m)(1)(B)(2).
12 Id. § 45(m)(1)(B).
125 Id.
' The voluntary methods of compliance have been severely criticized:
The voluntary methods of enforcement permit commercial wolves
to take not just one 'free bite' (as is the case even with cease and desist
orders since they also do not inflict penalties for past offenses) but two
or three.
As actually administered, voluntary enforcement is even more
inadequate than it seems. Trade-regulation rules and assurances are
often poorly drafted, the rules sometimes too broad (no more than
restatements of the statutes they are supposed to elucidate), the as-
surances too narrow (forbidding only a specific deceptive activity,
ignoring other likely tactics). The advisory opinions that business calls
upon the FTC for are frequently given with inadequate background
information. And, like trade-regulation rules, they tend to be mere
paraphrases of vague statutory language.
E. Cox, R. FELLMETH & J. SCHULZ, THE 'NADER REPORT' ON THE FEDERAL TRADE
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tion of civil penalties for rule violations enhances the consumer pro-
tection-capabilities of the FTC's cease and desist power. 27 This power
is not helpful to consumers who have already been injured by a decep-
tive practice. Rather, it operates to deter warrantors from engaging
in unfair acts. Proper utilization of this power along with the power
to obtain damages on behalf of persons injured by violators of the Act
will increase consumer protection.
The passage of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act evinces more of a congressional policy
than a master plan for consumer protection. Until many of the defini-
tions which the Act sets forth are given judicial form, businessmen
will have to act without knowledge of the implications of their ac-
tions.'2 The FTC's authority to commence civil actions represents a
chance for effective consumer protection. However, the availability
of class actions under § 110(d) of the Act is unclear. It too may be a
significant tool for consumer redress if the procedural problems can
be overcome.
Nevertheless, if the prohibition against the disclaimer of implied
warranties induces warrantors to refrain from warranting their prod-
ucts, 2 the net effect of the Act will be a reduction in current con-
sumer protection. Ironically, the ultimate effectiveness of this con-
sumer protection scheme rests on the business world. If the Act in-
spires competition in the marketplace and thereby causes more sup-
COMMISSION 62 (1969). These voluntary methods of enforcement are assurances of
voluntary compliance and informal corrective actions. "'Assurances of Voluntary
Compliance'. . . are signed agreements between potential respondents and the FTC."
REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 22 (1969).
Persons signing these agreements are required to submit a compliance report to the
FTC within 6 months after the agreement. No independent investigations are under-
taken to determine if there has actually been compliance with the agreement. Id. at
25. Informal corrective actions include, "exchanges of letters and purely verbal assur-
ances of discontinuance." Id. at 22. "The FTC makes no effort whatever to secure
compliance with ICA's [informal corrective actions]." Id. at 25.
In By subjecting rule violators to the possibility of civil penalties, Congress has
presented the FTC with powers which may be employed to expedite consumer redress
and avoid lengthy cease and desist actions. Moreover, rules issued by the FTC may
be brought to bear on a wide range of persons, while the cease and desist order method
is more piecemeal in its application.
'' See, e.g., the dilemma of gas appliance dealers, note 31 supra.
'2 Members of the Association of Home Appliance Manufacturers have indicated
that they are considering dropping their existing warranties altogether. B.N.A. ANn-
TRUST TRADE REG. REP., No. 717, A-7 (1975).
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pliers to offer "full" warranties,'30 the goals of the Act will be at-
tained. 3 ,*
JEFFREY W. MORRIS
' 120 CONG. REc. S21977 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (remarks of Senator Magnu-
son).
'' One goal of the Act is to provide better consumer protection. H.R. REP. No.
1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1974), reprinted at 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS
7702. There may be further problems with the Act in addition to warrantors withdraw-
ing their written warranties. The general consensus which has emerged from the hear-
ings on the FTC's proposed rules is that "the net result of the FTC rulemaking effort
will be consumer confusion and complication of warranty terms beyond consumer
comprehension." B.N.A. ANTITRUST TMADE RaG. REP., No. 731, A-1 (1975). Neverthe-
less, until warranties are given and the FTC's rules become effective, the ability of the
Act to provide consumer protection cannot be determined.
* The FTC promulgated final rules under the Magnuson-Moss Act on December
31, 1975. The rules which govern the disclosure of the terms and conditions of written
warranties and the pre-sale availability of these warranties become effective on Decem-
ber 31, 1976. The rules which regulate the informal dispute settlement mechanisms
become effective July 4, 1976.
The final rules provide that the disclosure and designation requirements imposed
on warrantors apply only when the consumer product being purchased actually costs
more than $15. 40 Fed. Reg. 60188-89 (1975). This replaces the $5 and $10 limits set
forth in the Act. See note 35 supra. The final rules have also clarified the definitions
of "consumer" and "consumer product." "Products which are purchased solely for
commercial or industrial use" are not "consumer products" under these rules. 40
Fed. Reg. 60188 (1975). Likewise, "consumers" do not include persons who are pur-
chasing "consumer products" for "use in the ordinary course of the buyer's business."
Id. These clarifications will exclude products which would have been warranted under
the proposed rules due to their normal usage and regardless of the purchaser or the
intended use of the product. See note 73 supra.
The final rules relative to informal dispute settlement procedures have altered the
proposed rules only slightly. The mechanism established by the warrantor must still
render a decision within 40 days after the submission of a claim to it. See text accompa-
nying note 104 supra. However, the mechanism may now postpone the decision for an
additional 7 days if "the consumer has made no attempt to seek redress directly from
the warrantor." 40 Fed. Reg. 60217 (1975). The final rules also provide the warrantor
with an extra 5 working days in which to perform any obligations due under a mecha-
nism decision or settlement with a consumer, which occurred after notification to the
mechanism of the defect in the product. The proposed rules would have required the
mechanism to ascertain within 5 working days whether or not the warrantor complied
with the settlement or decision. 40 Fed. Reg. 29898, proposed as Rule 16 C.F.R. §
703.5(h) (1975). The final rules extend this period to 10 working days. 40 Fed. Reg.
60217 (1975).
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